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COMPTES RENDUS 
observed. At the foundation of this study, and present 
like a shadow throughout it, is the Platonic-Christian 
view of time as an image of eternity, and of ourselves 
as redeemed from time, and able in part to compre-
hend it, through being in the image of God. 
The author repeatedly dismisses our Christian 
past, though never without reverence and sometimes 
with noticeable nostalgia. Had he chosen instead to 
wrestle with than angel he might have arrived at a 
defeat more impressive than his present victory. Not-
withstanding that, however, the reader of this history 
and exposition of fatalism will be not merely enlighte-
ned, but challenged. 
Graeme HUNTER 
University of Ottawa 
Gerald J. GALGAN, God and Subjectivity. New 
York, Peter Lang Publishing Inc., 1990, 
296 pages. 
In this monograph Galgan attempts to recast the his-
tory of the idea of being, beginning with Aristotle's 
conception of substance as the object of "first phi-
losophy", through Anselm's notion of God as the 
metaphysical link between Aristotle and Descartes, 
to Feuerbach's inversion of this tendency. Galgan has 
undertaken an ambitious task. In fact, I must admit 
that Galgan, employing the combined resources of 
the historian's philatelic care for details and the meta-
physician's predilection for propositional precision, 
has convinced me of his superb mastery of his sub-
ject-matter. Galgan's study, written with concision 
and clarity, and argued compellingly, recounts the 
transformation of being as substance to being as sub-
ject. "More specifically, as a report on the history of 
the concept of being, God and Subjectivity is a reflec-
tion on what mediates between the ancient founding 
and modern refounding of first philosophy. In essence 
it is about St. Anselm as a metaphysician — his 
meditation on and dialogue in first philosophy" (xii). 
In founding first philosophy, Aristotle understood 
being to mean not an hypostatization, but rather as 
an occurrence which inheres in particular and indi-
vidual things as a principle for their determination. 
Being, in other words, is the nature of things. In 
contradistinction to Parmenides, for whom being and 
thinking were convertible, Aristotle, in Galgan's view, 
maintains that substance or being, although disclosed 
in human thought, "exists independently of man's 
faculty of thinking or even his desire to thing" (xii). 
This disparity between the existence of the "this" 
and the cognizing agent posed no problem for first 
philosophy since 'the other", or object of cognition, 
was simply given, there for apprehension or obser-
vation. The situation would change with Descartes. 
Accordingly, with the Cartesian refounding of 
first philosophy, the human subject understands itself 
not as a given of nature, i.e., determined by it, but 
rather as a possibility that can master or lord it over 
nature. "The actualization and positivity of what is 
by nature are superimposed by the negativity and 
potentiality of what is human and particular. The 
modern refounding places man between God and 
nothingness" (xiii). Galgan intimates that being must 
now be construed in terms of the finite subject as a 
«'//'with infinite aspirations. Here again, a disparity 
is discernible. This time, instead of establishing a 
distance between being and the noetic agent, Des-
cartes focuses on his conviction that the ego implied 
in the dictum Cogito ergo sum is not, essentially, a 
being of nature itself. Because the subject is under-
stood as being substantially apart, ontologically 
removed, from nature, Cartesian thought suggests 
that, or allows for, the subject to impose itself on 
nature in whatever manner it pleases. The result is 
usually the human domination of nature. 
Situated between Aristotle and Descartes is 
Anselm. "The midpoint in this history of the concept 
of being — equidistant, so to speak, from the ancient 
founding and the modern refounding of first philo-
sophy — is the presentation of being qua being as 
the actuality of a creative substance which transcends 
form as such — a supreme, supranatural, particular 
'something' or 'aliquid'" (xiii). 
At this junction Anselm distinguishes himself 
from Aristotle's immanentism, i.e., the insertion of 
deity into the world as its first substance. In so doing, 
Anselm posits a God that is so extreme, so utterly 
different from the natural order that such a supra-
substantial existent is held to be the means by which 
all beings exist. The radical difference between crea-
tor and creature which Anselm establishes, whereby 
the former is postulated as a "essence which exists 
in a certain unique manner of its own" (47). removes 
him from Aristotle's tightly-knit metaphysics and 
draws his somehow closer to Descartes's apparently 
open system. 
This God, construed as spirit, shares the 
thoughtsfulness or thought-imbued, noetic dynamics 
of the Aristotelian deity. It is, in brief, a supreme 
agent that is "eternally mindful of itself" (36). This 
means that Anselm's God regards itself eternally, and 
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by virtue of this special self-understanding, expresses 
itself non-temporally. Such self-expression is co-eter-
nal with God. Indeed, as with St. John, the word is 
God. 
According to Galgan's account, Anselm's God 
differs from Aristotle's deity in that the latter's con-
ception of divinity amounts to the perfection of final 
causality, whereas for the former, God utters itself 
irrespective of the existence or non-existence of the 
world. Further, "the word by which it utters itself 
and the word by which it utters the created world are 
of one substance, for even if nothing but that supreme 
spirit ever existed, reason would still testify to the 
'necessity of the existence' of that word by which 
this spirit utters itself and which does not exist as 
other than what this spirit itself is" (36). The Imma-
nence of Aristotelian theology and the transcendence 
inherent in Anselm's mode of reflection are presented 
as being at odds with each other. In effect, Anselm 
conjoins what is, being qua, with the primary 
impulse of reason: to legitimate and guarantee that 
"that than which nothing greater can be conceived", 
coincide with faith. That is why Galgan can write: 
"We are, then, truly at the midpoint in the transition 
from substance to subject in first philosophy" (95). 
The radicality of Cartesian philosophy, however, has 
not yet emerged. 
Whereas the dialectic of Anselm's discourse is 
concerned with demonstrating that a being which 
exists in the understanding would necessarily exist 
outside of human understanding, Descartes's efforts 
concentrate on the ability of his thought to affirm its 
existence as an actual substance, i.e., something that 
really exists. Descartes attempts to do this by means 
of a negative act of cognition: doubting. The res 
cogitans can doubt anything except its own existence. 
According to Galgan, Descartes transforms the 
essence which defines Anselm's God into the prin-
ciple which defines human subjectivity. In fact, 
Anselm's God exists independently of human under-
standing. Descartes's ego cogitans, too, "would pre-
sumably exist... even if there were nothing else for 
it to think, nothing from which it could distinguish 
itself — even if there were, so to speak, no wax... 
or any other body" (117). Galgan argues that 
Anselm's God as the supreme subject, and Des-
cartes's thinking substance as radical subjectivity, 
revolve around the notion of truth. In the former, 
truth is construed as rectitude: the certainty of truth; 
in the latter, truth is understood as representation 
truth as certainty (98). The point, in Galgan's view, 
is to show how certainty can be the essence of truth. 
For this reason, Galgan undertakes a meticulous 
reading of the fifth meditation. He reinforces the 
theme of this meditation, which amounts to showing 
that eternal essences, such as the being of mathe-
matical entities, can serve as an heuristic device to 
remind us that God's essence is as immutable and 
established, independent of human volition and 
wiles, as are the definition of a valley. As Galgan puts 
it, "But when he attends more diligently to this mat-
ter, it is clear that no more than he can separate from 
the essence of a triangle the fact that the magnitude 
of its three angles equals two right angles, or from 
the idea of a mountain the idea of a valley, can the 
existence of God be separated... from the essence of 
God" (136). But the Cartesian ego acknowledges its 
finitude ; through this gesture, the cogito establishes 
the implicit necessity of God. For otherwise this res 
cogitans would be unable to admit or posit that a 
world exists, and would correspondingly regard itself 
as an unbounded or infinite being. 
Implied in the Cartesian refounding of first phi-
losophy, where the impulse of egological volition is 
manifested in terms of truth-as-certainty (Wahrheit 
als Gewissenheit), is the attempt of late modernity to 
make of subjectivity a "systematic essence" (166). 
Galgan thinks that this effort beings with Feuerbach. 
Hitherto, reality has somehow been associated with 
reason, and reason has been grounded in divinity. 
With Feuerbach, however, "only the human is real 
since only the human can be reasonable. Man must 
be proclaimed as the measure of intelligibility in 
order to bring modernity to its consummation, to 
bring it to the fulfillment of its hidden task, viz., the 
humanization of God, the final dissolution of theo-
logy into anthropology" (166). 
I have greatly enjoyed reading this scholarly con-
tribution to the metaphysical tradition. Although I 
am not a metaphysician, I must admit that Galgan's 
study has been one of the most stimulating books I 
have ever reviewed. Not only should God and Sub-
jectivity be read by the philosophical community, but 
it ought to be a required text for any course in ancient 
and medieval philosophy. 
Roy MARTINEZ 
Spelman College, Atlanta 
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